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Editorial:
RADICALISM AND POLITICS OF  RELIGION
Radical Islamism has become the “sexiest” issue in the
international scholarship of religion since the September 11 tragedy in
2001. It has been associated with a number of terrorist attacks not
only in the West but also in Muslim countries. Every single of  radical
Islamism has caught the interest of not only scholars and policy makers
but also general public. Interestingly, the general assumption that
religion is the source of peace has been seriously challenged, not by
non-religious communities, but by the violent practices of particular
religious groups, however small they are. Indeed, there are certain
groups striving for Islam but by using acts which could give awful
image on Islam itself  and against humanity.
Many scholars have tried to explain these phenomena, most of
which using economic, cultural and political analyses. Without
disregarding such efforts, Ali Mabrook tries to trace the basic ideology
which leads to the (ab)use of religion as legitimacy for committing
terrorism and violence on the one hand and for perpetuating despotism
and authoritarianism on the other hand. This ideology is “absolutism”,
which is rooted, according to Mabrook, in the dogmatic system of
Ash‘arism, one of  Sunni theological school. Taking for granted that
this system is not only theological, Mabrook argues that it was vulnerably
useful for ideological and political purposes. He also suggests that the
only solution to get out of Muslim/Arab crisis is to replace the tradition
of absolutism with the “culture of consciousness”. This can be
achieved through deconstruction of  Muslim/Arab mind, apart from
the critique of  their political practices. Mabrook has shown in his article
that the Ash‘arite dogmatic system which has dominated most (Sunni)
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Muslim world should be seriously scrutinised and deconstructed to
unearth the progressive elements of Islamic legacies applicable for
contemporary Muslim demand for reform.
In Indonesia, radical Islamist groups have been proliferated since
the collapse of Soeharto regime in 1998. Some could be traced back
to the Darul Islam or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII—Indonesian Islamic
State) movement existing since Soekarno era, but some others are
transnational movements, or local movements inspired ideologically
by certain Islamic movements in the Middle East. They are small in
number, indeed, but insistent in their endeavour to dominate Islamic
discourse in the country. Recently, they gained some success in
enforcing the dissolution of Ahmadiyah. The Government issued the
Join Ministerial Decree on the ban of the dissemination of Ahmadiyah
teachings openly, but not the ban of  the organisation itself. Some
Islamist movements are not satisfied and demanded more. They
organised demonstrations to force the president to issue the Presidential
Decree to ban Ahmadiyah one and for all.
Observing closely these movements are interesting. There are
two important Indonesian regions witnessing the rise of radical
Islamism, viz., Solo and Maluku (Moluccas). Solo, a town in Central
Java, has been known as the place where radical movements, both
Islamic and communist, emerged since the Dutch colonial era. In the
New Order, a pesantren in this region, Ngruki, was known as radical
pesantren, because its leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir
were associated with radical Islamist movement, Negara Islam Indonesia
(NII—Indonesian Islamic state). In post-New Order, especially after
Baasyir’s return from Malaysia, pesantren Ngruki became again the
symbol of radicalism. Some Muslim terrorists, such as Amrozi, Ali
Ghufron, and Imam Samudera, have some relationship, directly or
indirectly, with pesantren Ngruki or with Sungkar and Baasyir. Today,
Solo has been presented by international and national media as one of
the most important sources of radical Islamism.  Muhammad Wildan
has competence in discussing the proliferation of radical Islamist
movements in this town. He was graduated from Pesantren Ngruki
and has conducted intensive fieldwork research on this subject for his
PhD dissertation, of which this article is a part. His study is important
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to answer national and international curiosity about the role of Solo in
the context of the development of radical Islamism in Indonesia.
Unlike Solo, Maluku was a battleground of  Muslim-Christian
conflict in post-New Order Indonesia, especially from 2003. The
conflict, in which thousand people from both sides were killed, reflected
the radicalisation process of both Muslim and Christian communities
on the one hand, and the weakening of the state on the other hand.
Badrus Soleh focuses on the existence of  radical religious groups,
especially Islamist, in the region, and compares them with those in
other regions, argues that the growth of local nationalism and instability
of States in Southeast Asian regions have brought about the rise of
religious radicalism and paramilitary forces in Maluku, which challenge
harmony, peace and multicultural relations. Badrus also argues that
local communities, both Muslim and Christian, mostly preferred to
negotiate their differences in a peaceful manner. Most radical groups
were influenced by external jihadi groups, mainly the Laskar Jihad. To
Badrus, Laskar Mujahidin is “a radical Muslim network that is the
product of the radicalisation of local Muslims as a result of the activities
of radical activists from outside Maluku” established in 1999. Laskar
Mujahidin comprises of  Mujahidin Kompak, former members of  the
Darul Islam and the Jama’ah Islamiah group active in Maluku and Poso.
Other researchers believe, however, that Laskar Mujahidin is a
paramilitary group under the aegis of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI) established in 2000. Despite this difference, it is important to
highlight Badrus’ argument that Laskar Mujahidin will continue to pose
serious challenge for Indonesian security, and that Indonesia needs
stronger regional and international cooperation through the ASEAN
and Asia Pacific security networks.
The above phenomena raise a question about the state policies
on religious diversity. Islamist movements generally claim that the
Government should adopt representative policy on religious affairs. In
this representative logic, Muslim should get most the cake, because
they are majority. This demand has been voiced since before the
Independence in 1945. The founding fathers agreed on the view that
Indonesia is not an Islamic state, although the majority of its citizens
are Muslims; but it is not a secular state either. It is a “Pancasila state”
xthat allows state’s engagement in religious affairs, without being trapped
in a theocratic mechanism. State policies on religious diversity have
been changing from regime to regime. During Soekarno era, religious
pluralism was highly respected. Confucianism was considered officially
as the sixth recognised religions. In the New Order period, however,
the State recognised only five religions: Islam, Protestantism, Roman
Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism; Confucianism was therefore
excluded. The latter was recognised again in post-New Order era under
Abdurrahman Wahid. Mujiburrahman examines the State policies on
religious diversity in New Order period. He argues that the State policies
were directed mostly by Muslim interests, which were mainly driven
by their fear of Christianization. This fear has led Muslims to
consistently insist the Government to accommodate their five demands:
(1) restriction on establishing new places of worship; (2) restriction on
religious propagation, and control of foreign aid for religious
institutions; (4) Islamic religion classes should be given to Muslim
students studying in Christian schools; (5) inter-religious marriage should
not be allowed. Dialogue and inter-religious harmony, which were
endorsed by the Government as well as religious leaders, are other
issues discussed in his article.
Apart from religious diversity, Indonesia is engaged also in
managing h}ajj services, but not in other religious pilgrimages. Unlike
other Islamic devotions, h}ajj is a complex enterprise. It does not only
involve religious piety, but also tourism and its associated business
necessary to deal with massive parties of pilgrims, embracing trans-
national relations, central and local governments, flight and other travel
agencies, pilgrimage guidance units, catering agencies and hotels to
the pilgrims themselves in its scope. Nur Ichwan analyses the politics
of  h}ajj services during Soeharto era, and traces also the genealogy of
h}ajj monopoly by the Government. He also examines ‘umrah (small
h}ajj) services in the same period. He argues that the complexities of
h}ajj (and ‘umrah) services were not so much caused by religious aspect
but rather by political and economic motives.
In this present edition, Al-Ja>mi‘ah provides also other interesting
articles on women’s issues, particularly polygamy in contemporary
Muslim countries, particularly Malaysia, written by Raihanah Abdullah,
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and on the relationship between Islamic sciences and social and human
sciences, and critical account of  the hadith “Alla>humma ba>rik lana> fi>
sha>mina> wa fi> yamanina> (O, Allah, bless us in our Sham and Yemen),
two Arabic articles written respectively by Layth Suud Jassim and
Eeman Mohd. Abbas and by ‘Amma>r Ja>sim Muh}ammad al-‘Ubaydi>.
Enjoy reading this edition!
